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Abstract
Although employment relations in Europe have long been
seen as a factor of rigidity, limiting managerial discretion
and adaptability, in the last 30 years, they have witnessed a
trend towards decentralisation of collective bargaining and
negotiations increasingly centred on flexibility–security
trade-offs between employers and employees. Research on
the contribution of collective bargaining to the so-called
flexicurity has mostly focused on national-level institutional
arrangements. In this article, we contend that meso-level
differences need to feature more prominently in the debate.
Our comparison of two sectors in the same country
(chemicals and metalworking in Italy) shows that decentrali-
sation has divergent effects on flexicurity issues depending
in particular on differences in market structures and on
depth of bargaining. The interplay between these two
factors affects what we refer to as procedural security, which
we view as important in ensuring sustainable trade-offs
between flexibility and security.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Research into work and employment has increasingly explored the interplay between macrolevel dynamics and
organisational practices. For example, recent studies of national systems have sought to explore the extent to which
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organisational practices are shaped by national-level institutions (Björkman, Fey, & Park, 2007; Doellgast & Marsden,
2019; Goyer, Clark, & Bhankaraully, 2016). Similarly, critical human resource management (HRM) studies have
become increasingly sensitive to the influence of national context and institutions on the approach firms take to
HRM (Cooke, 2018; Kaufman, 2015).
Notwithstanding the recognition in extant research of the influence of institutional effects on organisation level
HRM practices, there is a tendency in HRM and broader employment relations (ER) studies to overlook that the
effects of national institutions are significantly mediated by mesolevel factors. “Mesolevel” refers to the level
between the national and organisational one. Sectoral dynamics, in particular, are an important source of institutional
variation with effects on the governance of work and employment within organisations. In this article, we focus on
the influence of sector-specific market structures on collective bargaining (CB) over flexibility and security trade-offs
and the manner in which this, in turn, exerts pressures on the organisational level.
Being situated in an intermediate position between the prevalent modes of labour market governance, sector-
level CB represents a significant, albeit overlooked, policy arena within which flexibility and security balances can
emerge. In multiemployer bargaining systems, it is the sector agreements that set guidelines and create incentives
towards economic and social targets which companies then translate into various work practices, including training,
flexible contracts, personnel rotation, and pay systems (Pulignano, Doerflinger, & De Franceschi, 2016). Institutions
at sector level are still predominant in most Western Europe. In the United Kingdom, such institutions have largely
eroded in favour of company or individual negotiation. However, sector-level CB has been recently rediscovered by
the opposition Labour Party as something to restore, exactly in order to balance flexibility and security.1 Despite its
traditional neoliberal views, even the OECD (2018) has recognised in its latest Employment Outlook the positive
effect of sector CB in reducing inequalities. While prior research has demonstrated how different national systems of
CB have dealt with flexicurity, little is known about sector differences in the capacity of CB to address flexibility and
security and to affect the resources available at the company level to deal with uncertainty. Therefore, we make a
unique contribution by providing a mesolevel analysis that explores structural and institutional variations in key
sectors (chemical and metalworking) and the impact these have on the bargaining agenda in Italy.
More rapidly changing markets and technological conditions since the decline of “Fordism” have resulted in a
need for employers to increase flexibility in labour use while simultaneously ensuring the requisite workforce com-
mitment and loyalty to enhance technological innovation and ensure product quality. However, for employees, this
has the potential to increase uncertainty and the risk of unemployment and poverty (Pulignano et al., 2016). As
such, inspired by national welfare models in countries such as Denmark, the flexicurity concept has emerged at
European level as a flagship employment policy to address such tension. Flexicurity is based on the notion that it is
possible to promote organisational labour flexibility while simultaneously providing employment (and financial)
security via active labour market policies and national social security systems, which provide compensatory safety
nets for the unemployed (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). Thus far, research has highlighted that most (national) experi-
ences have increased flexibility at the cost of security (Heyes, 2011; Meardi, 2011). However, these studies risk
masking the possibility of considerable within-country variation. In this article, we contribute to theorising the
impact of mesolevel institutions such as sector CB on organisational practices, by analysing the flexicurity agendas
of chemicals and metalworking. This is important given the varying capacity of firms in different industries to deal
with economic uncertainties.
Flexicurity is, in theory, a typical mutual gain, positive-sum area on which CB can make a positive contribution
(Eurofound, 2015; Hayter, 2011; Ibsen & Mailand, 2011; Paolucci, 2017). For example, while negotiating, unions
may accept the removal of job demarcation in order to gain functional flexibility and protect jobs. In return,
employers may strengthen their commitment to training and education to provide greater employment security.
However, in their exploration of the metalworking sector in six European countries, Marginson and Galetto
(2016) found that recent trends towards further CB decentralisation have had significant effects on the content of
collective agreements (CAs). In particular, where decentralisation is delegated through the use of “opening clauses”
(i.e., the sector identifies specific limits within which firms can negotiate), the substantive scope to negotiate
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flexibility and security tends to be more restricted. In contrast, where decentralisation is demarcated (i.e., sector CB
devolves specific competences to firm-level bargaining), the substantive scope for flexibility and security tends to be
wide. If similar differences exist between sectors within a given country, this highlights the possibility for consider-
able within-country variation in the potential for CB to deliver flexicurity, which national-level cross-country analyses
might fail to identify. Therefore, this study aims to develop a more nuanced understanding of the role of sector-level
institutions in accounting for differences in flexicurity outcomes in different sectors within the same country.
Our study, as mentioned above, compares the content of CAs in two different manufacturing sectors (chemical
and metalworking) in a single country (Italy). Crucially, Italy's multiemployer bargaining system has been defined as
one of “flexible rigidity”, providing flexibility at the company level while continuing to offer security via sector-wide
CAs (Marginson & Sisson, 2006). Our analysis of sector-level CB is informed by the interaction between structural
and institutional factors. First, structural characteristics of the sectors, such as skills, technology, the nature of capital,
and company size, are found to shape the substantive agenda of sector-level agreements, leading to what we term
embedded flexicurity. Second, the differential presence of shop stewards at the company level, which affects what
Clegg (1976) referred to as depth of bargaining, is found to affect what we term procedural security, that is, a shared
understanding of and compliance to the rules governing the relationship between social partners across
bargaining levels.
The ensuing section develops two propositions regarding within-country, cross-sector variations. We then apply
these to the case studies (Section 4). Section 3 describes our methods, and Section 5 presents the empirical investi-
gations of our propositions. The paper's final section offers a discussion of our findings and concluding remarks.
2 | SAME CHALLENGES, DIFFERENT SECTORS: CB PATHS TO
FLEXICURITY
2.1 | The bargaining agenda
Though national institutions have been shaken by converging international pressures towards deregulation, differ-
ences in structural conditions—technology, cost of capital, level of skills, and market barriers—produce cross-sector
divergence in the operation of capitalist forms of production and consequently in the substantive agenda of CB.
Research shows how the greater the vulnerability of capital to workers' direct action, the more employers feel
compelled to accommodate workers' demands (Silver, 2003). This means that structural conditions affect the extent
to which working conditions can be regulated through CB. With increasing market volatility, the focus of CB shifted
from productivity to firms' competitiveness, leading to agreements aimed at meeting both economic (short-term) and
social (long-term) objectives (Léonard, 2001). CB has progressively engaged with items ranging from the liberalisation
of working hours, nonstandard employment contracts, part-time work, functional mobility of employees, and
performance-related pay to the recognition of social benefits, lifelong learning, and skills development (Eurofound,
2015). Thus, the extent to which employers use multiemployer bargaining to handle economic pressures has become
crucial in shaping the scope of sector-level agreement which can be either “complete”—when encompassing a wide
range of topics—or “incomplete”—when only a few topics remain the object of CB (Marginson & Sisson, 2006,
p. 181). This has important consequences for companies. First, the scope of sector CAs affects the degree to which
company-level managers and employees are constrained by higher-level standards. Second, the potential transfer-
ability of firms' policies largely depends on sector-level institutions (Paauwe & Boselie, 2003).
Drawing on this body of work for our flexibility–security analysis, we therefore expect that in sectors with vola-
tile product demand and labour-intensive context, characterised by low skills and technology requirements,
employers have a high need for flexibility. In such sectors, employment security is more expensive and therefore
more contested, and the scope of CA will tend to be incomplete. By contrast, in sectors with less volatile product
demand and capital-intensive context, characterised by high skills and technology requirements, there is more scope
for sector-level agreements to cover flexibility as well as security-enhancing measures in a complete way.
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In other words, structural sector characteristics, such as demand and capital-labour composition, will affect the trade-
offs between flexibility and security of the sectoral CB agenda (Proposition A).
2.2 | To delegate or not to delegate? Sector-company relations
Scholars demonstrated that sector-specific structural characteristics have had a further key role: By developing
incentives for collaboration between unions and employers, they contributed to the establishment of well-
functioning second-tier bargaining. Marginson and Sisson (2006) argued that in largely internationalised markets,
intensive in capital and skills, employers were generally more inclined to legitimise the presence of shop stewards at
the workplace as, by engaging in collective negotiations, they could acquire ways to respond quickly to changing and
competitive environments.
Despite a tendency in ER literature to portray employers as a monolith, either driven by a logic of cost
minimisation or passive “institutions takers,” evidence suggests that their interests are actually heterogeneous and
can cut across territorial, as well as functional and business boundaries (Behrens & Helfen, 2019; Ibsen & Navrbjerg,
2019; Sheldon, Della Torre, & Nacamoulli, 2019). In industries dominated by organisations with similar operating
models (because, e.g., they are all largely internationalised, well-established in their niche global market, and intensive
both in capital and skills), employers have historically avoided disruptions at the workplace and oriented their rela-
tionship with unions towards securing consensus (Silver, 2003). The resources available to sectors with a large num-
ber of multinationals have given enormous advantages to employers in dealing with workplace-based employee
representatives. In contrast in more diversified sectors featuring small and large businesses (domestic and foreign-
based), where both wage share and international competition are high (e.g., metalworking), employers have been
generally less preoccupied with containing conflict and with fostering collaborative relationship on the shop floor.
Here, fewer resources available to invest in social dialogue and on employee development have reduced possibilities
for win–win compromises (Pulignano et al., 2016) or mutuality in employment relationships (Boxall, 2013).
By shaping a force field (Baccaro & Howell, 2017) within which different types of employers and employees set
the terms of their (collaborative/adversarial) relationship, structural characteristics have historically opened (or not)
the possibility for unions to strengthen their presence in firms, thereby conditioning the centrality accorded to the
company level in multiemployer bargaining systems (Iversen, 1996). This micro–macro linkage between market condi-
tions and institutional factors is reflected in the depth of CB (Clegg, 1976), namely, the capacity of sector-level unions
to impose constraints on employers by coordinating their actions with workplace-level representatives.
We argue that in the process of labour market liberalisation and CB decentralisation that has affected Western
European countries, including Italy (Colombo & Regalia, 2016), sector differences are becoming increasingly
important for the scope of CB. Within two-tier bargaining systems, in sectors characterised by widespread presence
of workplace-level representatives, social partners will trust the capacity of company-level actors to find workable
compromises and, through programmatic broad agreements, will steer—rather than control—their agenda items. In
contrast, in sectors characterised by a low depth of bargaining, the limited capacity of the company social partners to
negotiate suggests that the sector may be accorded higher regulatory functions, that is, the sector agreement will be
increasingly prescriptive in what to negotiate at the lower level. Put differently, the depth of CB will affect the nature
of coordination between sector and company-level bargaining and therefore the confidence in manageability of flexibility
at lower levels (Proposition B).
3 | METHODOLOGY
Scholars have warned against “methodological nationalism” and suggested that comparative research moves beyond
“national models,” which imply coherence and homogeneity, to explore differences across sectors (Bechter,
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Brandl, & Meardi, 2012). Our contextualised comparison (Cooke, 2018; Mahoney, 2007) is therefore based on a
qualitative, in-depth comparative analysis of sector CB in the chemical and metalworking industries in Italy.
Despite belonging to the overarching umbrella of manufacturing, the nature of the selected industries differs
noticeably in terms of skills, technologies, and product market. The focus on sectors likely to display distinctive
demands for flexibility and security provided meaningful insights into the evolution of traditionally homogeneous
national CB institutions. With its multiemployer system, Italy exemplifies a case of relatively well-governed CB
arrangements and “organised decentralisation” (Crouch & Traxler, 1995) where decision making is organised
between sector (establishing minimum levels of key working conditions) and company (engaging in organisation)
specific needs. Like other European Union countries, Italy has recently undergone significant reforms of the national,
intersector framework of ER (in 2009 and in 2011, details below) which, while maintaining the two levels of CB, has
given greater discretion to the company level, calling into question the sector-level capacity to coordinate and
address flexibility and security.
To assess the impact of these reforms on the flexicurity CB agenda, we carried out a content analysis of all
sector-level agreements in the Italian chemical and metalworking sectors over the past two decades (from 1998 for
chemicals and 1999 for metalworking to those most recently signed at the time of the research, 2015 for chemicals
and 2016 for metalworking). These were coded according to their contribution to the dimensions of flexibility and
security. Given that CAs were signed in different years for the two sectors and have varying duration (4 years until
2009 and then 3 years), they were grouped into 5-year blocks to facilitate the comparison (Table 3). Our research
then draws on 30 semistructured interviews undertaken between 2010 and early 2017 with sector-level employers'
associations and trade unions officials, as well as with experts of relevant research centres. This was complemented
by a close analysis of relevant reports and publications, press releases, specialised websites, and journals.
The operationalisation of the content analysis was based on the four forms of flexibility (external, working time,
functional, and wage) and the four types of security (job, employment, income, and combination) designed by
Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 171), summarised in Table 1 and most commonly found in the flexicurity literature. The
content of CAs was classified in relation to their capacity to address internal (working time, wage, and functional)
and external (hiring and firing employees and use of nonstandard contracts) forms of flexibility, as well as different
forms of security—job protection, provisions to ensure employability, stability and continuity of income, and “combi-
nation” security, which refers to the security enjoyed by a worker who is able to combine work with other private
responsibilities or commitments. As in previous studies, through negotiations in these categories, the social partners
generate multiple flexicurity outcomes. To give an example, CB on training could boost functional flexibility for
TABLE 1 Coding of collective agreement provisions enhancing flexibility and security
Items in CAs classified as enhancing flexibility and/or security Flexibility dimension Security dimension
Pay Wage flexibility Income security
Training and education Functional flexibility Employment security
Job security
Job demarcation Functional flexibility Job security
Income security
Working time Working time flexibility Combination security
Provisions for atypical employees External flexibility Employment security
Social benefits and entitlements Wage flexibility Income security
Combination security
Measures for employment External flexibility Employment security
Source: Wilthagen and Tros (2004); Ibsen and Mailand (2011); Marginson and Galetto (2016).
Abbreviation: CAs, collective agreements.
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employers while increasing the value of employees in the labour market, providing them greater employment
security; or social benefits and entitlements could improve security for employees in exchange for different forms of
flexibility, that is, wage or working-time flexibility.
In the next section, we review how the latest developments of the Italian ER system reshaped the role of sector-
level bargaining. Then, we introduce the sector-specific characteristics—structural and institutional—which are
expected to affect the capacity of sectoral bargaining to address flexibility and security in the two strategic industries
of metalworking and chemicals.
4 | OUR CASES: CHEMICALS AND METALWORKING COMPARED
In line with a trend common in most European countries, increased market competitiveness in Italy led to the
reconfiguration of bargaining towards greater decentralisation from sector to company-level bargaining. In 2009, a
new “Framework Agreement for the Reform of the Collective Bargaining System” was signed by the union
confederations—Cisl and Uil (although not by the largest, Cgil)—and Confindustria, the largest employers' organisa-
tion. The intersector agreement recognised opt-out clauses to allow company-level bargaining to derogate from
sector-level provisions as a way of coping with a “situation of economic crisis” or promoting vaguely defined “eco-
nomic and employment growth” (Burroni & Pedaci, 2011). It did not include any explicit control over the
decentralising provisions, blurring the traditional boundaries of competence demarcation and increasing the distance
between sector and the company levels. In 2011, another intersector agreement was signed, this time by Cgil too,
which reinforced the 2009 decentralisation trajectory.
How was such enhanced freedom to decentralise and derogate from sector-level agreements to be interpreted
in structurally different sectors? This question motivated our research, and the chemical and metalworking sectors
were a natural choice for comparison. Several studies of key transformations in CB are based on these two
well-established sectors as they typically exemplify distinctive ER models marked, respectively, by cooperation and
conflict (to name the most recent, Colombo & Regalia, 2016; Pulignano et al., 2016; Dorigatti, 2017). In our case,
moreover, chemical and metal sectors combined make Italy the second largest manufacturing country in Europe.
They differ not only in terms of product market (structural characteristics) but also in how company-level interests
are represented in CB. First, both chemicals and metalworking are internationalised and export-dependent
manufacturing industries. Their production processes are organised on a continuous basis and traditionally
characterised by well-established relations between trade unions and employers' associations. They differ, on the
other hand, in terms of companies' size, workforce skills, investments in research and development, wage share, and
volatility of demand in their respective markets, as is evident in the greater downturn experienced by metalworking
following the 2008 economic recession. The key characteristics of the two sectors are summarised in Table 2.
In capital-intensive contexts with low (er) volatility of product demand, as in the chemical sector, CB is expected
to have a greater capacity to grant security-enhancing measures (Proposition A).
Second, although the same two-tier, demarcation structure of CB applies to both chemical and metalworking
sectors, the workforce covered by company-level bargaining varies significantly mainly due to differences in their
respective product markets (i.e., company size, nature of capital, technology, and skill requirements). Estimates on
the percentage of employees covered by company-level CB show 80% in the chemical sector as opposed to 40% in
metalworking (Burroni & Pedaci, 2011). Alternative capital–labour combinations in the chemical and metalworking
sectors, namely, skilled employees in the market and cost-insensitive employers in the former and weak
(er) employees in the market and cost-sensitive employers in the latter—to use Iversen's terminology—have, over
time, affected the institutional configuration of their multiemployer arrangements, particularly the strategic relevance
of company-level bargaining. As put forward by Proposition B, where the depth of bargaining is low (er), such as in
metalworking, the sector-level CB is expected to have greater regulatory function.
6 PAOLUCCI AND GALETTO170 PAOLUCCI AND GALETTO
The National Federation of the Chemical Industry (Federchimica) and the National Pharmaceutical Industry
Federation (Farmindustria) are the employers' organisations. On the union side, the three most representative sector
organisations are the Italian chemicals, textile, energy, and manufacturing workers federation (Filctem-Cgil); the
Energy, chemicals, and allied industries federation (Femca-Cisl); and the Chemical, energy, and manufacturing
workers union (Uilcem-Uil). Despite the fact that traditional political affiliations are still important within the chemical
sector at the confederal level, employers and trade union organisations have historically shown a distinctive level of
pragmatism (Colombo & Regalia, 2016). In particular, unions in this sector have long realised that in a climate of
growing international competition, technological change, and new skills requirements, the only way to deflect contin-
uous attempts at marginalisation was to secure well-functioning company-level CB, as well as strong links between
sector and company-level actors. The social partners in the chemical sector jointly agreed upon, and committed to,
the need to govern rather than resist bargaining decentralisation. The unions' collaborative approach, combined with
the willingness of the employers' associations to avoid tensions, was apparent in the last three bargaining rounds
when, in contrast to other manufacturing sectors, the actors jointly signed smooth and speedy renewals of their
sector CAs.
In metalworking, the main employers' organisation is Federmeccanica, whereas for employees, the three main
sector organisations are the Italian Federation of Metalworkers (Fiom-Cgil; the oldest union and still the largest), the
Federation of Italian metalworkers (Fim-Cisl), and the Italian union of metalworkers (Uilm-Uil). The three generally
collaborated until the 1990s and shared similar views, but in the last 30 years, their relationship has become increas-
ingly dialectical, featuring the more radical Fiom-Cgil on one side and Fim-Cisl and Uilm-Uil on the other. Their con-
flicting positions started to arise over successive trends of decentralisation towards company-level agreements,
TABLE 2 Key characteristics of chemical and metalworking sectors
Sector characteristic Chemical Metalworking
Number of employees (%
variation 2007–2018)
175,600 (−10%; source: Federchimica) 1.6 million (−19%; source: Federmeccanica)
Union membership 47% (source: Eurofound) 36% (source: Federmeccanica)
Employees covered by
company-level CB
(Burroni & Pedaci, 2011)
80% 40%
Employees working in
firms with more than
250 employees





61% (source: Federchimica, Sole 24 Ore) N/A




30% (source: Federchimica) 14.3% (source: Marini, 2016)
In-job training 42% of employees (source:
Federchimica)
14.2% (source: Marini, 2016)
Wage share 11–20% (source: Federchimica) 40–60% (income share spent on labour
costs; source: Federmeccanica and
individual companies' budget reports)
Production levels
(2007–2018)
+11.6% (source: Federchimica and
Farmindustria) “True success story”
(interview to Farmindustria, 2014)
−22.7% (source: Federmeccanica)
“Post-war scenario” (interview to
Federmeccanica, 2014)
Abbreviations: CB, collective bargaining; N/A, not applicable; R&D, research and development.
Sources: Federchimica 2014, Federmeccanica 2016.
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changing mechanisms of wage determination and managerial discretion in imposing flexible working time arrange-
ments. Since the beginning of the 2000s, in particular, Fiom-Cgil committed to resist further decentralisation, in
order to protect employees in small companies from further flexibilisation (70% of the workforce is employed in
companies with less than 250 employees; Federmeccanica, 2018). The greater vulnerability of lower skilled
employees (a larger number of whom work in this sector than in chemicals) and the increased threats of relocation
and outsourcing of operations (a common business strategy during the crisis) exacerbated the tension between the
social partners. This led to “separate agreements,” when Fiom-Cgil refused to sign the renewals of the sector CAs,
especially after the 2009 national reforms, questioning the validity of the national ER framework and contributing to
uncertainty both at sector and company level.
5 | FINDINGS
Through the in-depth analysis of the CAs of the past 20 years, we were able to gauge the effects of both structural
and institutional characteristics on the flexicurity trade-offs between employers and employees.
5.1 | Meanings of flexicurity: Negotiating an embedded flexicurity
Our study shows how the role of CB in addressing substantial issues of flexibility and security varies according to
the structural characteristics of the sector—volatile product demand and high workforce skill levels being the most
prominent. Starting with flexibility, the chemical industry shows greater capacity to enhance it both in the internal
and the external labour markets. In 1998, the social partners had already agreed measures on intensifying training
and relaxing job classifications to meet high levels of functional flexibility demanded by a sector characterised by
intense and continuous process-based technology. The reform of job classifications was aimed at achieving a multi-
skilled and multifunctional workforce, and “normalised” working weekends and experimental plans, such as overtime
accumulation in exchange for personal time-off, were intended to improve working-time flexibility. This resulted in
internal forms of flexibility being more prominent than external forms of flexibility, such as, for example, the use of
atypical employees.
By contrast, metalworkers' job classification has been the object of long and unresolved discussions since the
1970s. Unions in particular have been reluctant to revise it because of the potential implications on the pay scale.
The most prominent form of flexibility emerging from our analysis is therefore working-time flexibility, which is
achieved through the categories of working time and measures for employment. Examples of measures for employ-
ment include short-time schemes—to favour reduced working time or rotation of workers in place of dismissals—and
state-funded forms of income support. In line with Proposition A, flexibility in metalworking has been negotiated pri-
marily to the detriment of employees who are forced to choose between working longer hours and sacrificing their
work–life balance (e.g., requests for part-time arrangements were restricted in 2009) and reducing their working time
in order to save jobs (solidarity agreements at company level aimed at sharing the working hours among those
employed to avoid redundancies). The type of flexibility required by employers—especially after the 2008 economic
crisis—involved the erosion of important employees' protections, and the unions (especially Fiom-Cgil) have been
reluctant to bargain over the existing provisions. Moreover, training in metalworking is consistently aimed at
protecting vulnerable, low-skilled employees and at increasing employability through the provision of “portable”
skills. Targeted mainly at groups such as apprentices and migrant employees, training is used to boost employment
security rather than functional flexibility. Finally, given the demarcation provided by the intersector agreement, the
bulk of wage increases was traditionally established at sector level and implemented industry wide.
Focussing on security, the chemical industry shows greater capacity than the metalworking industry to enhance
this dimension, in particular job security. Again, consistent with Proposition A, given a product demand that is rela-
tively less vulnerable to economic fluctuations, as well as the high technological content of their activities, employers
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in chemicals are more likely to invest in training and skills than in metalworking, as confirmed also by interviews.
Hence, although employers have developed incentives to retain employees and contributed to functional flexibility
through continuous on-the-job training both for permanent and non-permanent employees, apprenticeship
programmes, and a relaxation of job classifications, unions have gained enough power to secure generous salary
provisions, and social entitlements, such as integrative pension plans and health insurance, along with significant job
and employment security.
In the metalworking sector, the most bargained forms of security have been employment and income.
Employment security was negotiated via the extension of training for atypical employees in the sector. Income security
is a cornerstone of this sector's negotiations. Pay scales for all employees were an exclusive competence of sector-
level social partners, and only variable, productivity-related pay was established at company level. However, the role
of sector-level agreements was progressively challenged by the mounting economic pressures. In the most recent,
long-overdue metalworking agreement renewal (2016), only pay adjustments to inflation were secured at sector level
and only for the lowest paid employees. All other employees would see their pay increases entirely determined at
company level. This represents an epochal change for metalworkers and suggests that in sectors where product
demand is volatile, the wage share is high, and workforce skills and technology are relatively low, it is more
challenging for trade unions to protect jobs (and will therefore make concessions on pay) and to develop security in
the internal labour market.
By engaging with a wider range of bargaining topics, primarily, working-time, job classifications, training, and
social benefits, CB in the chemical sector has consistently produced a variety of balanced flexicurity outcomes.
Structural conditions in metalworking, on the other hand, led to defensive CAs. Controversial items such as revision
of job classification, digitalisation of work, and professional training were excluded from sector-level negotiations for
a good part of the 2000s and 2010s. By restricting the scope of bargaining, metalworking CAs had the aim of
preventing the negotiation of unbalanced flexicurity outcomes. Traditional items, such as working time, remain the
main “currency” used to secure, as much as possible, jobs; since the crisis, training has been used to enhance employ-
ability in an increasingly vulnerable labour market. In 2016, 250 hours are granted to employees attending compul-
sory education, as opposed to 150 hours for more professional training.
Although this confirms that sector-level CB is indeed an arena for trade-offs between flexibility and security, the
analysis also highlights how sector-specific characteristics lead to an embedded flexicurity (Proposition A) Table 3.
TABLE 3 Bargaining items contributing to flexibility (F) and/or security (S) covered in sector agreements in
chemical (C) and metalworking (M)
Years
1995–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2016
F S F S F S F S
Pay C C M M
Training and education C C, M C C, M C, M C, M C C
Job classification C C C C C C
Working time C, M C C C M M M
Provisions for atypical employees M C M M
Social benefits and entitlements C C M
Measures for employment C M C M
Note. Years of the chemical collective agreements analysed are the following: 1998, 2002, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015.
Years of the metalworking collective agreements analysed are the following: 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2013,
and 2016. In bold font, content covered in more than one agreement in the time frame.
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5.2 | Who wants less rules? The importance of procedural security
The intersector agreements of 2009 and 2011 pushed for a decentralisation of CB at company level and opened up
all sectors to derogations. Greater room for manoeuvre is usually regarded as desirable for business, but our cases
reveal polar opposite responses from the relevant actors in the chemicals and metalworking. The former resorted to
self-regulation, whereas the latter struggled to save both sector and company-level CB due to adversarial relations.
In other words, greater scope for decentralisation promoted at the national level has taken different shapes across
the two sectors affecting an important dimension: the procedural security provided by the sector to lower level
bargaining. Table 4 identifies the items of flexibility and security that, according to the relevant sector-level CA, were
left to be negotiated at company level.
As early as 2006, chemicals had already jointly agreed “Guidelines for company-level negotiations and deroga-
tions of national provisions.” In contrast to the new intersector agreements, these guidelines provided stricter rules
for derogations, as well as mechanisms to preserve the hierarchy between the two bargaining levels. By setting
specific boundaries of competences at company level but also allowing for and monitoring derogations, they
enlarged both the breadth and scope of firm-level bargaining. This leads to an increased regulatory capacity of
company-level actors. While relying on the procedural security set by the sector-level agreement (i.e., shared frame-
work), organisations can strike their own, firm-specific flexibility and security balances.
Consistent with this, a key feature unanimously emphasised by the social partners interviewed is a “culture of
two levels of collective bargaining,” where the sector agreement provides a “menu” of options from which the
company-level actors are trusted to pick what best fits their own organisational conditions. All the categories of flex-
ibility and security which are relevant to this study can be object of lower level negotiations, namely, pay, training,
working time, social benefits, provisions for atypical workers, job classifications, and any measures to boost employ-
ment. This opportunity is used by companies to negotiate primarily on issues such as productivity bonuses, overtime
premia, shift allocation criteria, and training opportunities. A recently introduced item in chemicals CA is that of a
sectoral fund2 aimed at cofinancing the early retirement of senior employees who, before leaving, mentor newly
hired staff. The so-called generational bridge allows employers to continuously acquire up-to-date skills and enhance
employees' performance through inter-age work teams. Such sector initiatives are highly valued by employers.
Although the main function of sector-level social partners is to negotiate employment conditions and foster a culture
of “constructive” social dialogue, company-level actors, unions, and HR managers can translate higher level guidelines
into ad hoc provisions to improve productivity and competitiveness.
Sector-level social partners report that this “participative” culture of “trust” and “collaboration” across bargaining
levels' was developed by unions and employers within a favourable economic context and reproduced over time
TABLE 4 Bargaining items contributing to flexibility (F) and/or security (S) to be covered by company level
according to the relevant sector agreements—chemical (C) and metalworking (M)
Years
1995–2000 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2016
F S F S F S F S
Pay C C Ca C C C, M
Training and education Ca C M
Job classification Ca Ca
Working time Ca, M Ca Ca, M C Ca C, M Ca, M Ca, M
Provisions for atypical employees Ca, Ca Ca
Social benefits and entitlements C C C C, M
Measures for employment Ca Ca C, Ma C, M C C
Note. In bold font, content covered in more than one agreement in the time frame.
aSubject to derogation.
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through ongoing negotiations. Until the late 1990s, the chemical sector had a larger share of state-owned enterprises
than metalworking. A tradition of “investment in human resources” survived waves of privatisation and the arrival of
foreign, large multinational companies. CB became central to the sector as it offered both the normative stability in
the face of massive privatisations and companies' restructuring (job security) and the capacity to improve efficiency
and productivity levels in the face of increased international competition (flexibility). These structural conditions,
while strengthening mutual interdependencies between the social partners, put a premium on company bargaining
whereby employers gained the flexibility they needed to cope with market uncertainty. At the same time, unions
increased their involvement in the sector's strategic choices and saved jobs in times of economic difficulties.
Although firm-level actors continue to rely on the protection of sectoral provisions which frame and steer their
agreements, CB becomes an autonomous space whereby pragmatic and organisational aspects of work can be (re)
negotiated.
Conversely, the 2009 ER reform had a substantial impact on the procedural agenda of CB in metalworking. Not
only did Cgil (the largest union in Italy) not sign the 2009 intersector agreement, but also Fiom-Cgil opposed the
implementation of the 2011 reform in the sector. As a result, the refusal of the largest sector union to sign the
renewals of the metalworking agreements in 2009, 2010, and 2012 increased tensions at company levels between
the various unions, increased uncertainty on the rules and validity of sector and company agreements, and, in brief,
seriously affected the governability of ER in the sector until 2016. The tension between the social partners reached
a peak with the 2011 reform because it included “dismissal protections” among the issues to be derogated to
company level. In response to Fiom's protests, Fiat, the largest car manufacturer in Italy, left Federmeccanica (the
employers' association) opting for a company-level only CA,3 undermining altogether the multiemployer bargaining
structure. The 2016 CA renewal, eventually jointly signed by all the three major unions and Federmeccanica, is the
result of an increased concern of unions to preserve the procedural function of the multiemployer bargaining
arrangement itself.
Interviews to the metalworking unions reported that their main concerns were businesses' threats of relocation
and outsourcing and the implications this would have for smaller, often contracted, companies with no workplace-
level representation structures. The adversarial relationship between the social partners until 2016 undermined the
already shaky ground on which the two CB levels rested. Prescriptive rules were therefore established at sector level
over possible exchanges between flexibility and security. Due to the reduced capacity of the unions to push forward
the interests of employees in a weaker structural position, the sector agreement has traditionally been interpreted as
a mechanism for minimum, universal floor setting, particularly by Fiom-Cgil, acutely aware of imbalances of power at
company-level bargaining tables. Before 2009, the metalworking sector agreements consistently referred to the
demarcation established in the 1993 ER framework: Company-level CB would have covered issues outside the scope
of sector CAs and always in meljius, according to the principle of favourability. Examples traditionally included work
organisation, additional holidays, contributions to additional pension schemes, or social insurance. After 2009, given
the economic problems of many firms, at sector level, wage moderation and working time flexibility were exchanged
for employment security. However, in the latest renewal, wage was negotiated at sector level only for workers at the
lowest point of the pay scale; all other employees' pay is now matter of company-level bargaining. Training too is
mainly responsibility of company negotiations, and employers now have greater discretion in modifying the sector
provisions.
We thus see that decentralisation has taken different shapes within the same national institutional framework of
ER. The way in which the two sectors dealt with the derogation options—pushed for by the 2009 and 2011
reforms—produced significant effects on CB coordination. In chemicals, the ability to derogate is limited to times of
crisis; it has a temporary character (typically 3 years) and needs to be linked to specific objectives. Conversely, in
metalworking, the deterioration of the relationship between the social partners, exacerbated by the economic crisis,
made it difficult to (re)negotiate coordination procedures. Company-level actors were left in a condition of legal
ambiguity during the years of separate agreements, without institutional resources to participate in the regulation of
flexibility and security.
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Indeed, although our analysis confirms that structural conditions do affect the degree of collaboration/conflict
between social partners, its enactment is contingent on a further important aspect: the presence and involvement of
shop stewards in company-level negotiations. Interviews in both sectors consistently highlight the importance of
strong links with workplace-level structures and extensive coverage of second-tier bargaining. Chemical sector-level
social partners can rely on shop stewards representing employees within companies and hence feel more secure to
open up the scope for firm-level bargaining. Benign structural conditions, together with a tradition of company
bargaining (secured by a wider presence of unions in the workplace), have promoted decentralisation with higher
levels of procedural security. Sector-level CAs in chemicals take the form of a programmatic document that is aimed
primarily at steering company-level bargaining. This accords to the sector and potentially to company-level actors an
important flexicurity function. In comparison in metalworking, where structural conditions are weaker and second-
tier arrangements less widespread, social partners struggled to jointly agree and finalise procedural rules governing
further decentralisation after the 2009 and 2011 reforms. A less robust presence of workplace representation struc-
tures suggests that despite the sector agreements retaining higher regulatory functions, the capacity of CB to serve
as a flexicurity too will in practice be limited. Currently, company-level actors in metalworking can opt-out of the
sector-level provisions whenever economic conditions require them to, including on all the relevant flexibility and
security categories. The dramatic exit from the sector CA of one of the main employers, Fiat, and its preference for
company-only CB, highlighted the system's vulnerability. The 2016 sector agreement, eventually signed by Cgil-Fiom
too, was based, in particular, on the shared priority to preserve a role for sector CB as a trusted source of regulatory
stability (a key factor to protect employers' investments) and as a minimum floor for those organisations lacking any
company level CB (a key concern for trade unions). Despite the renewed agreement among actors on its basic pillars,
such framework for the metalworking sector remains fragile.
In sum, the analysis of the two sectors reveals that even within the same national, institutional context of
employee relations, their CB trajectories can diverge. By actively regulating institutional devices, such as opening
clauses and derogations, social partners in the chemicals widened the scope for flexibility while offering an important
element of security: the procedural security offered to company-level negotiators within a shared and well-
established multiemployer system. In metalworking, on the other hand, the interplay between specific market condi-
tions and institutional factors made it difficult for the social partners to agree on procedures of articulation between
levels. As a result, company-level actors miss out on the protection offered by sector-level CB and are more exposed
to the effects of their own market structures. Employers will have to deal with higher degree of conflict and
uncertainty at local level, employees with greater power imbalances. To conclude, although sector CB does indeed
provide an arena of flexibility and security trade-offs, parallel one-size-fits-all policies promoting decentralisation
might introduce rigidity to multiemployer ER systems, producing diverging, and not necessarily more efficient,
outcomes for firms and employees.
6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis of CB agenda in the two sectors over the past 20 years has shown that both substantive and procedural
items have been progressively decentralised from national to company level. The interesting effect is a divergence in
industry-level actors' capacity to use CB to adjust to technological and economic changes. In the chemical sector, a
less-exposed industry, combined with a greater need for employers to avoid expensive disruptions, allowed for the
introduction of a wide range of flexibility and security measures onto the CB agenda, in particular functional flexibil-
ity, showing the evolution of CB towards a complete range of topics (Marginson & Sisson, 2006). On the other hand,
the higher concentration of low-skilled employees, the greater likelihood of delocalisation and outsourcing of
businesses and a more volatile product demand in metalworking had a direct impact on employment insecurity. We
found that what prevailed in sector-level negotiations were concessions on working time flexibility and wages.
Although some sectors continue to offer a platform where flexibility/competitiveness and security/solidarity can be
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reconciled, others—more volatile, lower skilled, competitive-oriented—engage mainly in defensive bargaining. The
resulting trade-off enhanced by sector CB is therefore best defined as embedded flexicurity, responding to a force
field made of sector-specific characteristics.
In addition, meso-institutional factors such as depth of bargaining and articulation affect the degree of procedural
flexibility and security provided by CB, higher in chemicals that in metalworking. By affecting the de facto possibility
of company-level negotiations, depth of bargaining becomes at least as critical as the type of articulation mecha-
nisms in place identified in Marginson and Galetto (2016). In combination, these dimensions mediate the impact of
structural conditions, offering procedural security to company-level actors—a form of security so far overlooked by
the literature on flexicurity. We demonstrated that more room for manoeuvre by the social partners at lower levels
“does not imply that higher levels renounced their authority” (Traxler, 1996), as long as the multiemployer bargaining
structure of each sector can rely on sufficient depth, that is, there are relatively strong representation structures at
company level to negotiate and enforce sector-level agreements. Although there is almost unanimous consent both
in scientific literature and international reports on the deterioration of CB institutions (e.g., Doellgast & Benassi,
2014; OECD, 2018), less attention has been paid to the (vertical) coordination offered by social partners. Our
contribution uncovers the capacity of sector-level actors to self-generate rules for company-level actors who, as a
result, are enabled to strike their own flexibility and security balances.
These findings on diverging effects of decentralisation for flexicurity are relevant for current policy debates on
CB. Sector CB is now recognised by institutions such as OECD and the European Union, to improve social equality
and to support companies' better economic performance in the long run (Eurofound, 2019; OECD, 2018). However,
as we show, a sector-sensitive methodology to the study of ER institutions is crucial. Our cases show that concomi-
tant, continuous pressures to decentralise contribute to widen within-countries differences. As a result, CB institu-
tions might allow for problem-solving in some sectors, but decentralisation could also make it less effective in others.
In countries where there is no sector-level CB, its introduction, as currently proposed for instance by the Labour
Party in Britain, may provide a useful platform for positive-sum negotiations of flexibility and security, but this will
be sensitive to the relevant, sector-specific structural characteristics. Its effectiveness will then be contingent on
firms' endorsement of such arrangements.
This contribution, to conclude, contends that academic and policy approaches that overlook structural and
meso-institutional differences within countries may be counterproductive for employers, employees, and firms.
Reducing bargaining coordination in sectors with weaker structural conditions and a low presence of representatives
in companies will expose local actors (unions and HR managers alike) to greater flexibility challenges. Within a
nationally rolled out process of decentralisation, mesolevel forms of regulation, between national and company
policies, become increasingly important contexts in which HR practices are embedded and can lead to more or less
successful outcomes in their quest for a competitive but secure workforce.
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